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1. I N T R O D U C T I O N  
1.1. The terms sakarmaka "a verb with an object, transitive" and akarmaka 
"a verb without an object, intransitive" appear  in PS.nini's grammar.  While 
the later commentaries do use the term dvikarmaka "ditransitive verb", the 
term does not itself appear  in PS.nini's grammar.  One can derive construc- 
tions with two or more  objects in the case of causatives, with the so-called 
akathita "non-characterized" object, and with adverbial accusatives (the last 
one especially if one accepts the traditional dictum kriydvidesandndm. 
karmatvam). There  are numerous syntactic issues relating to each of these 
constructions, and more  so especially with their passives. In this paper,  I 
wish to focus particularly on the traditional examples of akathita karman 
and discuss certain theoretical syntactic issues pertaining to their traditional 
explanation. A certain basic understanding of Pfmini's kdraka system is 
taken for granted. 
1.2. The following rules in Pfinini's Astddhydyi are relevant in this connection: 
P.1.4.49 (kartur fpsitatamam, karma): "That k6raka which is most desired to be attained 
(encompassed by the action?) by the agent is given the designation karman." 
P.1.4.50 (tathdyuktam cdnipsitam): "That which is not desired to be attained (encompassed 
by the action?) by the agent, but which is related (to the action) in a similar way is also 
given the designation karman." 
P.1.4.51 (akathitam. ca): "That kdraka which is not particularly specified otherwise is also 
given the designation karman." 
Here  I have given translations which are based on a general understand- 
ing of these rules. These rules are controversial, to say the least, and have 
generated a great deal of discussion in recent times, including proposals that 
rules P.1.4.50 and P.1.4.51 did not belong to the Ur-As.t.ddhydyf. I do not 
subscribe to this latter opinion, though it brings into focus the controversial 
nature of these rules. Again, I do not plan to deal with all these contro- 
versies at this time. I shall focus on P.1.4.51 (akathitam ca) and its tradi- 
tional examples. 
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1.3. Let us consider a typical traditional example to explain the functioning 
of P.1.4.51. Assuming that the situation to be described involves a person 
milking a cow, we have some of the following alternative possibilities. From 
the PS.nlnian point of view, both the cow and the milk may be considered to 
be fpsita "desired to be encompassed by the action". However,  both cannot 
be fpsitatama "most desired to be encompassed by the action". The tradi- 
tional choice for this status of "most desired" is the milk, rather than the 
cow. Thus, the milk can get the designation karman by the general rule 
P.1.4.49 (kartur fpsitatamam, karma). If we consider only the cow, without 
bringing the milk into the situation directly, then the cow by default may 
also get the designation karman by the same rule. Thus, without any dif- 
ficulty, we can get the following sentences: 1 
S1 
$2 
devadattah, payah, dogdhi "Devadatta milks the milk." 
devadattah gdm. dogdhi "Devadatta milks the cow." 
1.4. A difficulty arises when one wishes to include both the cow and the 
milk as arguments for the verb dogdhi. Of these two arguments, as explained 
earlier, the tradition picks out the milk as the ipsitatama "most desired" 
argument, and hence it gets the designation karman. How about the cow? 
Even if it were fpsita "desired" in some sense, it is certainly not the most 
desired entity. Therefore,  it cannot get the designation karman by P.1.4.49. 
The tradition considers the following alternative characterizations for the 
COW. 2 
(a) The cow as a non-kftraka: One may simply construe the cow 
with the milk in a non-kdraka way of possessor-possessed 
relation as in "cow's milk". This gives us the genitive case for the 
cow. 
(b) The  cow as a specific kgtraka: The cow may be considered as a 
specific kdraka, such as apdddna "point of departure, source" for 
the milk. This would give us the ablative case for the cow. 
(c) The cow as a non-specific iairaka: In this configuration, the 
speaker does think of the cow as a factor involved in the produc- 
tion of action, and hence a kdraka, and yet does not specifically 
categorize it as an apdddna "point of departure, source" etc. 
Being left unspecified, no specific kdraka definition would apply 
to it. In this situation, P.1.4.51 (akathitam. ca) says that a kdraka 
which is not specifically categorized gets the designation karman. 
Thus, the cow gets the designation karman by P.1.4.51. 
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devadattah, goh. (Genitive) payah. (Accusative) dogdhi Devadatta 
milks the milk of the cow. 
devadattah goh. (Ablative) payah. (Accusative) dogdhi Devadatta 
milks the milk from the cow. 
devadattah, gdm. (Accusative) payah. (Accusative) dogdhi Devadat- 
ta milks the cow the milk (?) 
1.5. Of these constructions, the construction represented by $5 with two 
accusatives is the most difficult to translate in any literal way, and presents 
the most complicated syntactic and semantic issues. In terms of the concep- 
tions in the Paninian tradition, the milk is described as the pradhdna- 
karman "principal object" and the cow is described as the apradhdna- 
karman "non-principal, secondary object"? If this is taken to reflect a 
difference in the semantic importance between the two objects, then one 
wonder if $5 could be rendered in a way which gives prominence to the 
cow, or must it be rendered in a way which gives prominence to the milk. 
1.6. Similar problems are encountered in modern linguistics as well. For 
instance, many linguists argue that a structure like $6 must be derived from 




Jay awarded Fiona the prize. 
Jay awarded the prize to Fiona. 
On configurational grounds, for Katz (1972: 105, 298--299), the prize in 
$7 is the direct object, and Fiona is the indirect object. J. M. Anderson 
(1984: 38) argues: "We can define object in English, using Katz's definition 
for direct object, but at some point in the derivation of a sentence like ($6) 
both N(oun) P(hrase)s will be objects and the P(repositional) P(hrase) in 
($7) is not an object at any point in its derivation (and it is not clear how 
we can characterize it even as an indirect object)". Do both the "objects" in 
$6 have the same status as direct objects, or is there any difference between 
them? A different kind of psycholinguistic insight into this process is offered 
by Osgood and Tanz (1977: 584). They assert that both unitransitive and 
bitransitive (== ditransitive) clauses are cognitively tripartite structures. A 
unitransitive nucleus such as Adam shelled the peanuts would consist of 
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Adam (M1 or "source of action"), shelled (--(M)--, 1), and the peanuts (M2 
or "recipient of action"). In the bitransitive John gave the book to Mary, 
John is M1, gave the book to is - - (M)~,  and Mary is M2. From the above 
analysis, Blansitt (1984: 128) argues that "it would follow from the hypothe- 
sis that (what we normally call) the direct object forms a single constituent 
with the verb in bitransitive but not in unitransitive clauses, and that (what 
we normally call) the indirect object is functionally equivalent to the uni- 
transitive (direct) object." This is an interesting conclusion with regard to 
the English examples given above. However, such a distinction between 
unitransitive and ditransitive clauses cannot be easily made in Sanskrit. In 
English, the sentences John gave the book and John gave the book to Mary 
seem acceptable, but John gave to Mary or John gave Mary would be 
unacceptable. In Sanskrit, we can have both S1 and $2 as grammatical 
unitransitive constructions, along with the ditransitive construction $5. Thus, 
it is not immediately clear as to how one would deal with these sentences in 
light of the ideas in Osgood and Tanz (1977). Since both the objects can 
appear in unitransitive constructions, it is not automatically clear as to 
which of these two objects would form a "single constituent with the verb" 
in the ditransitive construction. On intuitive grounds, some of the Sanskrit 
ditransitive constructions would seem to go against the above formulation. 
For most of the ditransitive verbs in Sanskrit, one would have to agree with 
Hock (1985) that they have two direct objects. However, some construc- 
tions seem to go contrary to the ideas found in Osgood and Tanz (1977). 
For instance, in a sentence like devadattah ajdm grdmam nayati "Devadatta 
takes the female goat to town", both aj~i .m "goat" and grdmam "town" 
appear in the accusative. It would seem intuitively appropriate to argue that 
grdmam nayati "takes to town" would form a single constituent, and yet we 
do not have in Sanskrit the unitransitive construction *devadattah. grdmam 
nayati "Devadatta takes to town." Thus, it would seem that at least in some 
Sanskrit sentences, the object which does not appear in unitransitive sen- 
tences, and appears only in ditransitive sentences forms "a single constituent 
with the verb". Thus, this conception does not help us understand the 
behavior of the Sanskrit ditransitive constructions. 
In the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, the following distinction is made: 
the ipsitatama "most desired" object is the principal object (pradhdna- 
karman), and the akathita-karman "the object with an unspecified kdraka 
role" is the secondary object (apradhdna-karman). Especially in the context 
of passivizing these constructions, the tradition offers us a list of verbs with 
two objects: 4 
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VERB PRINCIPAL OBJECT SECONDARY OBJECT 
(Accusative) (Accusative) 
dogdhi payah gdm 
to milk milk cow 
ydcate vasudhdm balim 
to beg earth Bali 
pacati odanam ta.n(l, uldn 
to cock rice rice-grains 
dand. ayati gatam gargdn 
to fine a hundred Gargas 
avarunaddhi gdm vra]am 
to confine cow cow pen 
prcchati dharmam mdnavakam 
to ask religious duty boy 
cinoti phaldni vrk4am 
to collect fruit tree 
brdtte dharmam mdnavakam 
to speak religious duty boy 
gdsti dharmam mdnavakam 
to teach religious duty boy 
]ayati gatam devadattam 
to win a hundred Devadatta 
mathndti sudhdm ksiranidhim 
to churn ambrosia ocean 
musndti gatam devadattam 
to steal a hundred Devadatta 
nayati ajdm grdmam 
to lead goat village 
harati ajdm grdmam 
to bring goat village 
karsati ajdm grdrnam 
to drag goat village 
vahati a]dtm grdtmam 
to carry goat village 
1.7. It  is c l ea r  f r o m  the  t r ad i t i ona l  d i s cuss ions  tha t  the  Sansk r i t  g r a m m a r i a n s  
c o n s i d e r e d  the  ob jec t s  l i s ted  in t he  s e c o n d  c o l u m n  as t he  p r i n c i p a l  ob j ec t s  
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(pradhdna-karman)  because these were the ipsitatama "most desired" enti- 
ties? The other objects are not as much a focus of desire, and they could 
appear  in other specific k(traka roles such as source and target, or in the 
simple relation of possession. Thus, these other objects are characterized as 
apradh~na-karman "secondary objects". 
1.8. A difficulty arises when one needs to passivize these constructions. 
Which of the two objects would get the nominative case and become the 
subject of the passive construction? Can we just say: Will the real object 
please stand up? 6 The tradition claims that there is no uniformity in this 
regard and that for some verbs the principal object gets the nominative, 
while for others it is the secondary object which gets the nominative. 7 No 
logic is offered to explain this difference of behavior, but we are simply 
given a list. For  the last four verbs listed above, the principal object gets the 
nominative, while for the rest of the listed verbs the secondary object gets 
the nominative. The passive constructions are given below: 
PASSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS 
Class A 
VERB PRINCIPAL OBJECT SECONDARY OBJECT 
(Accusative) (Nominative) 
duhyate payah gauh 
to milk milk cow 
yf~cyate vasudhdm balih 
to beg earth Bali 
pacyante odanam tand. ulfth 
to cook rice rice-grains 
dand. yante ~atam garg~h. 
to fine a hundred Gargas 
avarudhyate g~m vrajah. 
to confine cow cowpen 
prcchyate dharmam mdnavakah 
to ask religious duty boy 
ciyate phaldni vrks. ah 
to collect fruit tree 
ucyate dharmam mdna vakah 
to speak religious duty boy 
gis..yate dharmam mdna vakah 
to teach religious duty boy 
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PASSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS 
Class A (Continued) 
25 
VERB PRINCIPAL OBJECT SECONDARY OBJECT 
(Accusative) (Nominative) 
fiyate gatam devadattah 
to win a hundred Devadatta 
mathyate sudhfim ksiranidhih 
to churn ambrosia ocean 
mus.yate gatam devadattah 
to steal a hundred Devadatta 
Class B 
VERB PRINCIPAL OBJECT SECONDARY OBJECT 
(Nominative) (Accusative) 
nfyate aid grdmam 
to lead goat village 
hriyate aid grdmam 
to bring goat village 
krsyate aid grdmam 
to drag goat village 
uhyate afd grdmam 
to carry goat village 
1.9. Sanskrit grammarians  resort  to listing when they are unable to find a 
generalizable principle to describe the behavior  of  grammatical  items, and 
therefore,  it would  be safe to say that the grammarians  could not  come  up 
with a theoretical explanation of  why the two classes of  verbs behave differ- 
ently. They  could not  come up with a c o m m o n  explanation for all cases of  
objects appearing in the nominative. To  them, some of  these objects were 
principal objects and others were secondary,  i.e. some were the pr imary  
focus of  desire and others were not. 
2. PARTIAL SOLUTIONS IN SANSKRIT GRAMMAR 
2.1. N o w  I would like to review some possible solutions to this dilemma. 
There  are ideas scattered in the traditional commentar ies  which can be 
considered in a new light and extended to provide  an explanation of  the 
above seemingly anomalous  situation. N o n e  of  these ideas are fully devel- 
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oped in the tradition itself, but the seeds of these ideas are certainly pres- 
ent. It also shows that these ideas are potentially very powerful and are 
comparable  to ideas developed by modern  linguists like Hans H. Hock 
(1985). 
2.2. Ditransitives as Pseudo-Causatives 
2.2.1. Ramadeva  Tripathi (1977 :519)  suggests that, in a sentence like ajdm 
grdmam, nayati "He takes the goat to the village", the verb nayati may be 
considered to have the same meaning as the causative gamayati "makes it 
go". If such a suggestion is accepted, then the accusative ajdm can be 
explained, in some sense, as referring to the causee (prayojya-kartr) and 
hence being classified as a karman by P.1.4.52 (gati-buddhi-pratyavasdndrtha- 
gabda-karmdkarmakdndm ani kartd sa nau): "For verbs of  motion, thinking, 
eating, making sounds and intransitive verbs, that kdraka which is the agent 
of the pre-causative (ani, lit. non-causative) becomes the karman 'object/  
patient'  of the causative". It must be kept in mind that this suggestion is 
strictly speaking not a Pfininian procedure,  because nayati is not a causative 
verb from the Phninian perspective. However,  its assumed equivalence with 
gamayati allows us to extend the theory. 
2.2.2. A similar suggestion is seen in Kaiyata's comments  on the Mahdbhdsya 
on P.1.4.51. This suggestion appears  as a pr ima facie view (pf~rva-pak4.a) and 
is eventually rejected. The argument goes as follows: 8 
Now, the meaning of the sentence gdm dogdhi payah, is as follows: The cow releases the milk 
and Devadatta makes the cow release the milk. Since the cow is encompassed by the action of 
the causative agent, her status as karman is established. That is not the case. In the case of 
causative verbs there is an awareness that someone possessed of a certain action is employed in 
that action. Such is not the meaning in this case, because even an inactive cow is employed in 
the action of milking. 
2.2.3. Thus, it is not necessary that the cow be involved in any action. Simi- 
larly in the case of  verbs like nayati "leads, takes", harati "takes", karsati 
"drags" and vahati "carries", it would be hard to argue that the entity being 
taken is in every instance a prayojya-kartr "instigated agent". In the case of 
dogdhi, even if it were semantically equivalent with tydjayati, one would not 
get the causee to be karman "object" by P.1.4.52, because the verb tyaj is 
not covered by the list in that rule. One would get exactly devadattah 
GA VA payas tydjayati and not devadattah G.4M payas tydjayati. Thus, this 
alternative of  considering ditransitive verbs as some sort of pseudo- 
causatives does not work well. 
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2.2.4. This alternative of considering ditransitive constructions as pseudo- 
causatives is discussed at some length by Bhartrhari and finally given up. 
Kaiyata's argument is based on Bhartrhari. The argument in Bhartrhari has 
caused some confusion. S. D. Joshi and J. A. F. Roodbergen (1975: 183) 
interpret a versified V6rttika in the Mahdbhds.ya in a non-traditional way and 
conclude that by taking into account the linguistic facts of passivization etc. 
one must say that, in sentences like gdm. dogdhi payah, and gauh duhyate 
payah, the cow must be the principal object (pradhdna karman). Referring to 
Vdkyapadiya III 7.73 and Helfirfija's commentary on it, they say: (p. 183): 
"Bhartrhari maintains that gauh is the pradhdna-karman." This is somewhat 
misleading. In Vdkyapadiya III 7.70--77, Bhartrhari elaborates two views. The 
first view argues that there are different types of objects (bhinna-kakf.ya- 
karman). In this alternative, a gradation of objects such as principal and 
secondary is possible. In the second view presented in Vdkyapadiya III 7.73, 
Bhartrhari argues that the ditransitive constructions are inherently like 
causative constructions ( antarbhftta-n, ijarthdndm, n. ijantavat siddham pftrvena 
karmatvam). Thus, the cow being treated as a causee (prayojyakartr.) becomes 
a karman of the causative action in a normal way. In this view, then, there is 
no reason to propose gradations of karman, and therefore, both the objects in 
a ditransitive construction may be considered to be pradhdna or principal 
objects, one the object of the causative action, and the other the object of the 
pre-causative action. In this view, there is really no akathita karman. 9 On the 
other hand, Hel~r~ja proposes two separate notions of "principal" object. He 
says that from the point of view of the intended goal, the milk is the principal 
object. Yet the verb duh ultimately refers not to ksarana "flowing", but to 
ksdrana "the action of causing the cow to yield the flow of milk", and hence, 
linguistically speaking, the cow must be the principal object) ~ This view of 
Hel~r~ja is not to be found in Bhartrhari's verse itself, which argues for a non- 
differentiated status of karman. This view of ditransitive constructions as 
pseudo-causatives is ultimately rejected by Bhartrhari himself in Vdkyapadfya 
III 7.76--77. Bhartrhari points out that while the causee in a causative 
construction cannot be without action (niskriya), even an inactive cow can 
become an object of milking and an inactive goat can become an object of 
carrying. He finally concludes that verbs like duh and ni may be distantly 
paraphrased with causatives and yet are not real causatives. Since they are 
different word-forms (~abddntara), they signify a unique type of action with 
two objects. 11 
2.3. Object of Primary versus Secondary Access 
2.3.1. Why is it that with the ditransitive use of duh "to milk", the passive 
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finite verb ending (la) expresses the secondary  object, i.e. the cow, and not  the 
milk? In  the Pradfpa on Mahdbhdsya on P.1.4.51, we find a pair  of  verses: 12 
The suffixes called l (in passives of ditransitive verbs) are prescribed to express the secondary 
object. The first relationship is formed with the secondary object, because the person desiring to 
attain the principal object (such as the milk) certainly first makes an effort with respect to the 
cow. Thus, at the very beginning, the root duh by itself is brought into a relationship with the 
cow, prior to the connection of the verb duh bound to the cow with the milk. Therefore, the 
suffixes called l (in passive) are used to express the secondary object. 
Kaiyata paraphrases  these verses and says: 13 
Since the person who wants milk first initiates his action with respect to the cow, therefore, by 
the reason of being relatively closer (to the initiated action of the agent), the secondary object is 
expressed by the verbal affix (rather than the primary object). 
2.3.2. This is an interesting and impor tant  argument.  It also suggests a distinc- 
tion between the not ions of  ipsitatama "most  desired" and "that which the 
agent first acts upon".  Semantically, these are distinct concepts  and they seem 
to lead to different consequences .  While, the milk is the "most  desired" object, 
the agent must  first act upon  the cow in o rder  to achieve the "most  desired" 
goal. Thus  in terms of  the inherent  sequence  of,access,  the agent must  access 
the so-called secondary  object  first, and only then can he acquire the pr imary  
object. Viewed in this light, the passives of  mos t  Class A verbs immediately 
make  sense. Interestingly, this same logic also explains the passives of  Class B 
verbs. One  must  first get hold of  the goat  before  one can lead, take, drag or  
carry it to the village, and the village comes  only at the end of  these actions. 
Thus,  the pr imary  access is to the entity which is led, taken, dragged or  
carried, and not  the target locat ion to which it is taken. Here,  o f  course,  the 
i tem of  pr imary  access also happens  to be the item categorized as "most  
desired" by the tradition. Thus,  one  may  claim, at least in a prel iminary way, 
that the object  of  pr imary  access, whether  o r  not  it is "most  desired", is the 
one  which gets the nominat ive in the passive. If this not ion is accepted,  then 
the distinction between Class A verbs and Class B verbs disappears  and we 
can think of  a uni form explanation. 
2.4. Affected versus Non-affected Object 
2.4.1. In Patafijali's Mahdbhdsya on P.2.3.5 (kdl6dhvanor atyanta-samyoge), 
we find another  interesting idea, though here again it is placed in the mouth  of  
a p~trvapak4.in "upholder  of  a prel iminary view", and not  as a final conclusion.  
The  rule says that the second case ending is used for words  standing for a unit 
of  time or  distance to indicate uninterrupted connect ion  with an action or  an 
DITRANSITIVE PASSIVE IN PANINI  29 
entity. Fo r  example, consider  the sentence rndsarn adhite "he studies a whole 
month".  Here,  PSaaini does not  consider  mdsa "month"  to be a karman at all, 
but  merely prescribes the accusative case. Historically, this is the adverbial  
accusative usage. Kfityfiyana, on the other  hand, p roposes  that such time and 
distance words  should be considered to be karmavat "like karman", so that 
one  could get passive sentences like mdsah dsyate "a month  is spent sitting". 14 
After  discussing the objectives of  Kfity~yana's suggestion, Patafijali questions 
whether  such a separate statement needs to be made: 15 
Then, do we need to make this (separate) statement (that time and distance words under 
these conditions should be treated like karman)? 
There is no need to make such a (separate) statement. Such (time and distance words) stand 
for just the normal karman, as in the constructions katam karoti "he makes a mat" and 
gakatam karoti "he makes a cart". 
He (~ Kfity~yana) (seems to) think like this: A really justifiable karman is that in which a 
certain difference (of state) is brought about by the action. No difference is brought about by 
an action (in mdsa). 
Such a view (of normal karman) is not tenable. (With such a view) one could not derive 
even these examples: ddityam pagyati "he sees the sun", himavantam grnoti "he hears the 
(rumble of the) Himalaya", and grdmam, gacchati "he goes to the village". Therefore, (the 
time and distance words) are nothing but (instances of) normal karman, as in kat.am karoti 
"he makes a mat" and gakatam karoti "he makes a cart". 
2.4.2. While Patafijali rejects the supposed  view of  Kfityfiyana about  ny(~yya 
karrnan "really justifiable not ion o f  karman", that not ion may have relevance 
in the present  discussion of  ditransitive passive. It is clear that  Patafijali 
rejects this not ion because  it does not  cover  all instances of  karman. In 
other  words,  in some instances o f  karman one sees the entity being affected 
by the act ion and that a change of  state is b rought  about,  while in o ther  
instances one  sees no such change. One  can also see in this not ion of  
"affectedness" a scaler property.  Some objects may be m o r e  affected than 
others. This not ion of  affectedness is clearly different f rom the not ion of  
ipsitatama "most  desired". The  milk is the most  desired object, but  the cow 
is the mos t  affected object. Using this parameter  of  affectedness, one  can 
see that it explains almost  all the verbs listed above, i.e. Class A and Class 
B verbs.  16 Therefore ,  this not ion of  affectedness is relevant not  only seman- 
tically, but  syntactically as well, 
2.5. Agentive versus Non-agentive Object 
2.5.1. Hans  H o c k  (1985)  suggests that of  the two objects in a ditransitive 
construction,  the object which is more  agentive gets the nominat ive in the 
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passive construction. The Sanskrit grammatical tradition normally does not 
think in these terms. However, there is one context where one can test a 
notion of agentivity in relation to an object, i.e. the so-called reflexive 
passive construction. P.3.1.87 (karmavat karmand tulya-kriyah.) says that an 
agent (kartr) which is similar in its action to an object (karman) should 
be treated like an object. Normally, one says: devadattah odanam pacati 
"Devadatta cooks rice". This sentence ascribes the agency of cooking to 
Devadatta. However, if one wanted to say 'q'he rice cooks well", then, 
according to PSa?i. "ni, rice becomes the agent (karl..) of the action of cooking, 
and yet its action (~ participation in the action of cooking) is similar to that 
of a prototypical object. In a case like this, P~nini says that the agent should 
be treated like a karman for certain grammatical processes, such as getting 
the infix -ya- on the verb and the middle affix, i.e. odanah pacyate "the rice 
cooks (itself)". This type of construction is, for P- .anini, an active voice 
(kartari) construction and yet has the morphological markings of a passive 
construction. Such constructions magnify and stress the role played by the 
prototypical object by promoting it to agent. What about a construction 
that has two objects? In Vdrttika 14 on P.3.1.87 (duhi-pacyor bahulam 
sakarmakayoh.), Kfityfiyana proposes that one could optionally get reflexive 
passive constructions with verbs duh "to milk" and pac "to cook, ripen", if 
they are transitive (sakarmaka). In his discussion of this Vdrttika, Patafijali 
offers the following example: dugdhe gauh payah. (svayam eva) "The cow 
milks the milk (by herself)". The normal ditransitive construction would be 
something like: devadattah, gdm. payah, dogdhi "Devadatta milks the cow 
(acc.) the milk (acc.)". Of the two accusative objects, the object promoted to 
agency in a reflexive passive is the cow, and not the milk. The reflexive 
passive construction is considered to be a transitive construction, since it 
can still have one accusative object (payah.). This discussion implies that of 
these two objects, the cow is the more agentive object, and this agentive 
object gets the nominative in a ditransitive passive such as: devadattena 
gauh. payah duhyate. Again it must be pointed out that, in spite of this 
implication from this discussion, the tradition does not generalize this 
concept to claim that the more agentive object among the two objects of a 
ditransitive construction gets the nominative in the passive. However, such a 
potential is there in this discussion. 
3. CONCLUSION 
3.1. From the above discussion, it is clear that generally the traditional 
discussion of karman was guided by the parameters set by P~nini. Among 
DITRANSITIVE PASSIVE IN P,~NINI 31 
these parameters, the term ipsitatama "most desired (to be encompassed by 
one's action)" was quite central. The tradition made strenuous efforts to 
dissociate this term from the connotation of "most desired", and emphasized 
the basic verb root in this term, i.e. tip. The term was often glossed as tipya 
"entity to be encompassed by one's action". S. D. Joshi and Roodbergen 
(1975: 168ff.) completely reject the traditional interpretation of the terms 
ipsitatama and anfpsita as "most desired" and "not the most desired" re- 
spectively. They would rather have these terms mean "the object directly 
reached by action, direct object" and "the non-direct object". Having thus 
removed the factor of "desire" completely, they argue that in the sentence 
gaur duhyate payah., "the word go, which refers to the direct object (ipsitatama 
item), is passivized, whereas payas, which refers to the non-direct object, is 
not passivized" (p. 169). With this new interpretation of these terms, they 
do recognize that the rule P.1.4.51 (akathitam. ca) is not required (p. 170). 
In my opinion, any interpretation of PS.nini which makes one of his rules 
vacuous is most unlikely to be historically a Pfi.ninian interpretation. It may 
be theoretically more efficient, and yet historically un-PS_ninian. On the 
other hand, it is historically more cogent to argue that PSxtini's grammar 
was based on prior cultural and ritual categorizations of action and hence 
gave a prominent role to the notion of desire. Ritual action must be pro- 
totypically voluntary action. This accounts for the fact that the first defini- 
tion of karman refers to voluntary action of a sentient agent. P~nini, as a 
grammarian, was concerned with Sanskrit at large, and hence realized that 
there were other kinds of actions expressed in language which were not 
always voluntary or performed even by sentient agents. This extension was 
accomplished by P.1.4.50 (tathdyuktam ctinfpsitam). Then, the remaining 
cases of grammatical object were taken care of by rules like P.1.4.51. Thus, 
it is not a misunderstanding of Pfinini's rules, as claimed by Joshi and 
Roodbergen, but as a sign of continuity in understanding, that the element 
of desire remained in the consciousness of the Pfninian grammarians, 
eventually yielding the distinction of pradhtina-karrnan "principal karman" 
versus apradhtina-karman "secondary karman". These notions were impli- 
citly based on the notion of "most desired object", and they failed to 
achieve the maximal generalization in the case of ditransitive passive. The 
grammarians were ultimately forced to adopt the theoretically least prefer- 
able and uninformative method of listing verbs into two classes. Other 
notions such as "object of primary access", "the affected object" and "the 
agentive object" did occasionally appear in discussions, but were unfortu- 
nately never used to make the necessary generalizations. On the contrary, 
these notions always remained hidden amongst the rejected views of the 
32 M A D H A V  M. D E S H P A N D E  
Pfi rvapaksin .  O n e  could '  m a k e  at  least  a tenta t ive  guess as to why the no t ion  
of  "des i red  ob jec t"  r e m a i n e d  p r o m i n e n t  in Sanskr i t  g rammar ,  bu t  no t  the  
no t ion  of  "affected object" .  If  the  e m e r g e n c e  o f  Sanskr i t  g r a m m a r  is v iewed 
as pa r t  of  a genera l  re l ig ious / r i tua l  scholast ics ,  then it wou ld  seem na tura l  
that  the  semant ic  ca tegor ies  p r o m i n e n t  in r i tual  contexts  wou ld  con t inue  to 
exer t  thei r  inf luence  on  the semant ic  fo rmula t ions  in Sanskr i t  g rammar .  In  
V e d i c  ri tual,  the  p r i m a r y  c lass i f ica tory  ca tegor ies  seem to be  agent,  ins t ru-  
ment ,  loca t ion ,  ob jec t  of  desi re ,  ta rget  of  offerings,  the  ob la t ions  of fered  to 
the  divini t ies  etc. H o w e v e r ,  there  i s  no  c lear  no t ion  of  "affected ob jec t"  
involved  in ri tual.  In  V e d i c  r i tual  as fo rma l i zed  in the  ~r l i t e ra ture  and  
in NYllmSxns~t texts,  the  de i ty  receiv ing the  ob la t ions  of fered  is no t  v iewed in 
theist ic  light, and  b e c o m e s  jus t  one  of  the  r equ i remen t s  of  the  ritual. I t  is 
not  as if the  de i ty  is af fec ted  by  the offer ing and then  in r e tu rn  offers the  
des i r ed  result .  T h e  r i tual  act  i tself  is pe rce ived  as y ie ld ing the  des i r ed  result .  
Wi th  such a p e r c e p t i o n  of  r i tual  act ion,  the re  is no  no t ion  o f  "affected 
object" .  T h e  P~ninian  fo rmula t ion  of  the  no t ion  o f  "object"  can be  con-  
ce ivably  l inked  to  this p r i o r  cul tura l  backg round .  A s  we have  seen, the  
concep t ions  of  "affected object" ,  "objec t  of  p r i m a r y  access"  and  "the agen-  
tive ob jec t"  do  a p p e a r  in the  commenta r i e s ,  though  these  a re  no t  t aken  
seriously.  H o w e v e r ,  these  ideas  can be  t aken  out  of  these  confines,  and  if 
p r o p e r l y  tes ted  m a y  show the  way  to a be t t e r  unde r s t and ing  of  Sanskr i t  
syntax within the  Ind ian  t rad i t ion .  17 
NOTES 
l It is important to note that, for most verbs in Sanskrit which are ditransitive, one can have 
unitransitive usages with either of the two objects. This has led modern scholars to argue 
that the Sanskrit ditransitive constructions have two "direct objects". Hock (1985) upholds 
this view, and reviews arguments adduced by Gaedicke (1880) in support of this view. One 
must keep in mind that the Sanskrit terms pradh~na-karman and guna-karman are not 
equivalents of "direct object" and "indirect object". Even within the Sanskrit traditions, often 
there is no agreement on which of the two objects is pradhdna and which is apradhdna. 
While the grammarians generally argue that the milk is the principal object and the cow is 
the secondary object, one finds various diverse opinions mentioned in Gokulanfithopfidhyfiya's 
Padavdkyaratndkara (p. 591ff.). Also see: Helfirfija on Vdkyapadiya Ill 7.73, p. 289. 
2 Other alternatives are discussed in texts like Gokulanfithop:~dhyfiya's Padavd~kyaratnd~kara 
(p. 591ff.). For instance, Gokulanfithopfidhy~ya provides two alternative views. In the first 
view, the verb duh "to milk" conveys three meanings: action of the milkman (purus.a- 
vydpdra), flowing of the milk (syandana) and separation of the milk from the cow (vibhdga). 
Of these three meanings, the milkman's action and flowing are viewed as being actions 
(vytip~ra), while flowing and separation are viewed as being results (phala). The locus of 
action (vydtpdrddraya) is the agent (kartr.) and the locus of the result (phaldgraya) is the 
object (karman). The controversial case is that of the milk which happens to be the locus of 
flowing, which is the result of the milkman's action and an action in itself which results in 
the separation of the milk from the cow. Thus being the locus of flowing, both an action and 
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a result, there is a conflict between the milk being an agent and an object. Gokulan~thopfi- 
dhy~ya argues that the purpose of P.1.4.51 (akathitam. ca) is to resolve this conflict. In the 
second view, the verb duh denotes only two meanings, i.e. the action of the milkman and 
flowing of the milk which causes separation of the milk from the cow. This separation of the 
milk is not considered to be a separate meaning, but a secondary aspect of flowing. The 
locus of this secondary aspect of the result of the milkman's action becomes the secondary 
object. 
3 On the example gdm. dogdhi payah, Kaiya.ta says: anena gram. dogdhi payah ity atra payasa 
upayujyam~natv(lt ipsitatamatvam, gos tu payo'rthatv~d ap(M(masy6nipsitatamatvam 
dargayati/, Pradipa, Mah6bh6sya on P.1.4.51, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 264. 
4 The list given here is based on the list found in the Siddhdntakaumudi: (on P.1.4.51, p. 
307) 
duh-y6c-pac-dand. -rudhi-pracchi-ci-brfi-gdsu-fi-math-mus. dm / / 
karma-yuk sy(~d akathitam, tathd sy6t ni-hr-krs-vahdm// 
Phnini provides no such listing. The list first appears in the V6rttikas quoted by Patafijali on 
P.1.4.51. The duhddi list in the Mahdbhds.ya (Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 264) includes: duh, y6c, rudh, 
pracch, bhiks.., ci, brfi and gds. Outside the duhddi list, the Mahdbh6sya (Ibid., p. 270) lists 
ni, vah, hr and verbs of motion such as gamayati. The various commentaries on the 
Mahabh(~s.ya and on the Astddhy6yi discuss these and other verbs for inclusion in the 
duhf~di and the non-duh6di lists. For a discussion on the inclusion of the verb dand., see 
Note 5. From these discussions, it is clear that there are verbs not listed here which also 
have ditransitive usages, and other verbs which are synonymous with the listed verbs which 
do not have ditransitive usages. A great deal of discussion relates to the question of how to 
define the specific semantic configuration of these verbs. 
5 Cf. tad yathd -- garg~h, gatam dand.yant~m -- iti/arthinag ca r(tjdno hiranyena bhavanti/na 
ca pratyekam dand. ayanti/Mahdbh~sya on P.I.I.I., Vol. I, Pt. I, p. 112. "For instance, 
consider the example: "Let the Gargas be fined a hundred (coins)". The kings are desirous of 
the gold. They do not fine each (Garga) separately". On this passage, Kaiyata argues that 
gata "a hundred (pieces of gold)" is the principal karman, because it is the most desired 
goal: atra gatasyepsitatamatvdt prddh(myam ap~d~na-sthdnaprdptd gargd gunakarma/ Pradipa 
(Ibid., p. 112). NS.ge~abhatta disagrees with Kaiyata and argues that the Gargas are the 
principal object (pradh6na-karman) and that the root dand should not be included in the 
duh class: dandeg ca sva-sampraddnaka-ddndnukala-vydp6rfmukfda-vyflpdrah, g(tsana-rfipo 
'rthah/ g~sanam niyantranam/ tatra nyanta iva "kartuh. . "ity ubhayoh, karmatvam/kartr- 
pratyaya-samabhivydh(lre dhdtv-artha-pradhdna-vydpdra-vigesana-phalfdrayatvena garg~n6m 
g6bdam prddhdnyam/ tatraiva pradh~ne karmani lakdrah. / "pradhdna-karman. y dkhyeye lddin 
dhur dvikarmandm" ity ukteh./duh6dis, v asydprdmfn, ikah. pdtha iti vadanti/Uddyota (ibid., p. 
112). The debate hinges on the difference between the notions of drtha-pr6dhdnya "intended 
primacy" versus g6bda-prddh(mya "literal primacy". 
6 For recent discussions on this specific issue, see: Osgood and Tanz (1977) and Hans H. 
Hock (1985). 
7 One can also look at the patterns of usage for objective genitive in ditransitive construc- 
tions. For instance, one can certainly have devadattah, agvam, srughnam nayati "Devadatta 
takes the horse to Srughna". If nayati is deverbalized into netd "leader, taker", then which of 
the objects will appear in the genitive? Patafijali answers this question: atheha katham 
bhavitavyam -- net~gvasya srughnam iti/~hosvit -- netdgvasya srughnasyeti/ubhayatha 
gon. ikdputrah/, "How should it be in this case? (Should it be): net~i agvasya srughnam, or 
netd agvasya srughnasya? Gonikfiputra (~  Patafijali himself according to the tradition) says 
that one can have it both ways." Mah~bhds.ya on P.1.4.51, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 272. For some 
insightful discussion on this passage, see: Hock (1985: 61). He suggests that the less agentive 
of the two objects has the option of remaining in the accusative. 
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8 nanu g(~m dogdhi payah, ity asy~yam arthah -- gauh. payah, tyajati, devadatto gavd payas 
ty~jayati/tatra prayojaka-vy~pdren, dpyam~natv~t siddham goh. karmatvam/naitad asti/yathd 
nyantes.u dh~tus..u kriydvis.tah, prayujyate iti pratitih, tath~ naivam iha, nis.kriyasy@i gav~der 
dohanddisu viniyog(u/KaJyata on Mah~bh~i.sya on P.1.4.51, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 264. 
9 siddhd nimitta-nimitti-bhdvdvasthitasy@i sarvasya karman, ah. pfirvenaiva yogena karma- 
samjfieti n~sty akathita-karmety eMyamatenopany~sah./Helfirfija on V~kyapadiya III 7.74, p. 
291. 
1o yady api c(trthena rfipen.a payah, pradhdna-bhtitam, up6ya-bhfttd tu gauh., tath~py dbhi- 
dheyakena ks.aran, opasarjanasya ks..dran, asya gabddrthatv~t gaur eva pradhdnam karmeti 
tatraiva lddayah., Helfirfija on V~kyapadiya III  7.73, p. 289. 
11 tasrruin ndtra n.y-arthtintarbl~va iti kriyfz-dvayf~rayen, a api karma-vigesa-samarthanam 
a-samicinam/ tad evam ekaiveyam, vilaks.a.~ karma-dvaya-vis.ayd kriy6 iti/, Helfirfija on 
V~kyapadiya III 7.77, p. 293. 
12 guna-karman, i lKdi-vidhih, p(trvam, guna-karma.n~ bhavati yogah./ mukhyam karma prepsur 
yasm~d gavy eva yatate pr~k// tasm~c chuddhasya duher bhavati gav~ pFtrvam eva sambandhah/ 
go-duhind payas tu prdk, tasmdl lddayas tasmin//Quoted in Pradipa on Mah~bh@ya on 
P.1.4.51, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 268. N~ge~abhatta in his Uddyota attr ibutes these verses to 
Bhartrhari .  They are found quoted in Helfirfija's commentary  on Vdkyapadiya III 7.70, but  
ar e  not part  of the Vdkyapadiya itself. 
13 yatag ca payo' rthi prathamam gavi pravartate tatah, antaratigatvdt duhyddis..u gun. a-karmani 
ldtdayo bhavanti. Kaiya.ta on Mahdbhds..ya on P.1.4.51, Voi. I, Pt. II, p. 268. The  same 
argument  is found in Helfirfija's commentary  on Vdkyapadiya III 7.77, p. 293: aprtidhdnye' pi 
cdkathita-karman, o' ntarahgatvdt prathamam, kriy6-yogdl lddi-vidhir uktah./nayaty 6dau tu 
pr~dhfmyam aj, ider iti tatraiva l(tdayah./ n.yante tu n.y-arthasya pr~dhdnydt ten(tpyamfmatvdt 
kartaiva pradhdnam karmeti tatraiva l~dayah. / tatag ca 
pradhdna-karmany dkhyeye lddin tihur dvikarmandm/ 
apradh~ne duhddfndm n.y-ante kartug ca karmaoah.// 
iti ny~ya-siddham uddh.rtam/. It is impor tant  to note  that this logic is offered as the justifica- 
t ion for the choice of the object to be passivized by Helfir~ja and Kaiyata. This new justifica- 
t ion is offered without getting rid of the traditional conceptions of principal object and 
secondary object based on the notion of "focus of desire". 
~4 VKrttika 1 on P.2.3.5: atyanta-samyoge karmaval lfMyartham. 
15 tat tarhi vaktavyam? na vaktavyam/prdkrtam evaitat karma yathd kat.am, karoti gakat.am. 
karotiti/ evam. manyate/yatra kagcit kriydkrto vigesa upajdyate tan ny~yyam, karmeti/ na ceha 
kagcit kriy~k.rto vides.a upaj~yate / naivam ~akyam/ ih@i na sydt/ ~dityam pagyati/ himavantam 
g.m. oti/grdmam gacchati/tasm(~t prf~k.rtam evaitat karma yathd katam karoti gakatam karot~ti. 
Mah~bh@ya on P.2.3.5, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 490. 
16 The  verb rudh is a difficult case. The  usage cited by the grammarians,  i.e. vrajah, gdm 
avarudhyate works well only on the hypothesis that the secondary object vraja goes in the 
nominative. None  of the partial solutions above seem to explain it well. Hock (1985) argues 
that the object which is more  agentive takes the nominative. This also does not  seem to 
explain this usage, since vrajah, being inanimate is obviously the less agentive of the two 
objects. While this usage is cited by the grammarians,  it is not  attested independent ly in 
literature. 
17 For  a discussion of several related issues, see Deshpande  (Forthcoming-a) and (Forth-  
coming-b). 
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